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Abstract. The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) em-
bedded with vulnerable monolithic software, involving concurrency and
fragile communication links, has recently raised serious concerns about
their security. Recent studies show that a 2kg UAV can cause a criti-
cal damage to a passenger jet windscreen. However, verifying security
in UAV software based on traditional testing remains an open chal-
lenge mainly due to scalability and deployment issue. Here we investigate
the application of software verification techniques; in particular, existing
software analyzers and verifiers, which implement fuzzing and bounded
model checking techniques, to detect security vulnerabilities in typical
UAVs. We also investigate fragility aspects related to the UAV communi-
cation link since all remaining UAV components (e.g., position, velocity
and attitude control) heavily depend on it. Our preliminary results show
real cyber-threats with the possibility of exploiting further security vul-
nerabilities in real-world UAV software in the foreseeable future.
Keywords: Software Verification · Software Testing · UAV · Security.
1 Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), also sometimes referred as drones, are air-
crafts without human pilots on board; they are typically controlled remotely
and autonomously, and have been applied to different domains (e.g., industrial,
military, and education). In 2018, PWC estimated the impact of UAVs on the
UK economy, highlighting that they are becoming important devices in various
aspects of life and work in the UK, thereby leading to GBP 42bn increase in the
UK’s gross domestic product and 628, 000 jobs in its economy [24].
With this ever growing interest also comes a growing danger of cyber-attacks,
which can pose high safety risks to large airplanes and ground installations, as
recently witnessed at the Gatwick airport in late 2018, when unknown UAVs
flying close to the runways caused disruption and cancellation of hundreds of
flights due to safety concerns.3 Another popular example of cyber attack is one
3 https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/24/uk/gatwick-airport-drones-
investigation-gbr-intl/index.html
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related to when the Lebanese militant group (Hezbollah),4 produced several
footages of aerial view in late 2010, thus claiming to be intercepted from one
of the Israeli surveillance UAVs over Lebanon and accusing Israel of being be-
hind the Lebanese prime minster assassination. Therefore, it remains an open
question whether the CIA5 triad principles will be maintained during UAVs
software development life-cycle. UAVs typically demand high-quality software,
in order to meet its target system’s requirements. In particular, any failures in
embedded (critical) software, such as those embedded in avionics, might lead to
catastrophic consequences in the real-world. As a result, software testing and
verification techniques are essential ingredients for developing systems with high
dependability and reliability requirements, where they are usually needed to
guarantee both user requirements and system behavior.
Although Bounded Model Checking (BMC) was introduced nearly two decades
ago, it has only relatively recently been made practical, as a result of signifi-
cant advances in Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) and Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT) [5]. Nonetheless, the impact of this technique is still limited in practice,
due to the current size (e.g., number of lines of source code) and complexity (e.g.,
loops and recursions) of software systems. For instance, when a BMC-based ver-
ifier symbolically executes a program, it encodes all its possible execution paths
into one single SMT formula, which results in a large number of constraints that
need to be checked. Although BMC techniques are effective in finding real bugs,
they typically suffer from the state-space explosion problem [13].
Fuzzing is a successful testing techniques that can create a substantial amount
of random data to discover security vulnerabilities in real-world software [20],
but subtle bugs in UAVs might still go unnoticed due to the large state-space
exploration, as recently reported by Chaves et al. [6]. Additionally, according to
Alhawi et al. [1], fuzzing could take a significant amount of time and effort to
be completed during the testing phase of the software development life-cycle in
addition to its code coverage issues. Apart from these limitations, fuzzing and
BMC can enable a wide range of verification techniques, including automatic de-
tection of bugs and security vulnerabilities, recovery of corrupt documents, patch
generation, and automatic debugging, which have been industrially adopted by
large companies, including but not limited to Amazon Web Service (CBMC [7]),
Microsoft (SAGE [14]), IBM (Apollo [2]), and NASA (Symbolic PathFinder [8]).
For example, the SAGE fuzzer has already discovered more than 30 new bugs in
large shipped Windows applications [14]. Nonetheless, an open research question
consists in whether these techniques can be effective in terms of correctness and
performance to verify UAVs applications.
In order to make an impact to ensure UAV security, our research will in-
vestigate both fuzzing and BMC techniques to automatically detect security
vulnerabilities in real-world UAV software. Thus, our main goal is to build a
software system that has immunity from cyber-attacks and thus ultimately im-
prove software reliability. According to the current cyber-attacks profile w.r.t.
4 https://www.military.com/defensetech/2010/08/10/hezbollah-claims-it-
hacked-israeli-drone-video-feeds
5 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, also known as the CIA triad, is a model
designed to guide policies for information security [11].
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advanced UAVs, it becomes clear that the current civilian UAVs in the mar-
ket are not secure enough even from simple cyber-attacks. In order to show this
point of view, we highlight in our study real cyber-threats of UAVs by performing
successful cyber-attacks against different UAV models, which led to gain a full
unauthorized control or cause UAV to crash. We also show that pre-knowledge
of the receptiveness of the UAV system components to manipulation is all what
attackers need to know during their reconnaissance phase before exploiting UAV
weaknesses.
Contributions. Our main contribution is to propose a new approach for de-
tecting and exploiting security vulnerabilities in UAVs. In particular, we leverage
the benefit of using both fuzzing and BMC techniques to detect security vulner-
abilities hidden deep in the software state-space. In particular, we make three
major contributions:
– Provide an initial insight into fuzzing and BMC when applied to UAV soft-
ware;
– Identify different security vulnerabilities that UAVs are susceptible from.
Here we perform real cyber-attacks against different UAV models with the
goal of highlighting the cyber-threats related to them;
– Propose a preliminary verification approach called “UAV fuzzer” to be com-
patible with the type of UAV software currently being developed in industry
with the goal of detecting their vulnerabilities.
2 Background
2.1 Generic Model of UAV Systems
Reg Austin [3] defines UAVs as a system comprising a number of sub-systems,
including the aircraft (often referred to as a UAV or unmanned air vehicle),
its payloads, the Ground Control Station (GCS) (and, often, other remote sta-
tions), aircraft launch and recovery sub-systems, where applicable, support sub-
systems, communication subsystems, and transport subsystems. UAVs have dif-
ferent shapes and models to meet the various tasks assigned to them such as:
fixed wing, single rotor, and multi-rotor, as illustrated in Fig. 1. However, their
functional structure has a fixed standard, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Therefore,
finding a security vulnerability in one model might lead to exploiting the same
vulnerability in a wide range of different systems [10,12].
2.2 Cyber-Threats
A cyber-threat in UAVs represents a malicious action by an attacker with the
goal of damaging the surrounding environment or causing financial losses, where
the UAV is typically employed [17]. In particular, with some of these UAVs
available to the general public, ensuring their secure operation remains an open
research question, especially when considering the sensitivity of previous cyber-
attacks in literature [16,18].
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Fig. 1. UAV types: multi-rotor (a), fixed wing (b), and single-rotor (c).
Fig. 2. Functional structure of UAVs.
One notable example is the control of deadly weapons as with the US mili-
tary RQ-170 Sentinel stealth aircraft; it was intercepted and brought down by
the Iranian forces late 2011 during one of the US military operations over the
Iranian territory [18]. In 2018, Israel released footage for one of its helicopters
shooting down an Iranian replica model of the US hijacked drone [16]. Further
interest in UAV cyber-security has been raised following this attack. For exam-
ple, Nils Rodday [22], a cyber-security analyst, was able to hack UAVs utilized
by the police using a man-in-the-middle attack by injecting control commands
to interact with the UAV. As a result of previous attacks, UAVs can be a dan-
gerous weapon in the wrong hands. Obviously, cyber-attack threats exceeded
the cyber-space barrier as observed by Tarabay, Lee and Frew [16, 18]. There-
fore, enhancing the security and resilience of UAV software has become a vital
homeland security mission, mainly due to the possible damage of cyber-attacks
from the deployed UAVs.
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2.3 Verification of Security in UAVs
The UAV components are typically networked together to enable secure and fast
communication. Therefore, if one component fails, the entire system can be sus-
ceptible to malicious attacks. In this respect, various approaches have been taken
to automatically verify the correctness of UAVs software. In particular, following
the RQ-170 UAV accident in 2011, where Iran claimed hacking the sophisticated
U.S. UAV [19], a group of researchers from the University of Texas proposed
an usual exercise to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; simulated GPS
signals were transmitted over the air from 620 m, where the spoofer induced the
capture GPS receiver to produce position and velocity solutions, which falsely
indicated the UAV position [4]. A similar study conducted in early 2018 per-
formed a successful side-channel attack to leverage physical stimuli [21]. The
authors were able to detect in real-time whether the UAV’s camera is directed
towards a target or not, by analyzing the encrypted communication channel,
which was transmitted from a real UAV. As a consequence, these prior studies
were able to highlight GPS weaknesses, but they did not cover the UAV secu-
rity issues regarding all involved software elements, mainly when those zero-day
vulnerabilities are associated with the respective UAV outputs.
Other related studies focus on automated testing [9] and model-checking the
behavior of UAV systems [6, 26]. For example, a recent verification tool named
as Digital System Verifier (DSVerifier) [6] formally checks digital-system imple-
mentation issues, in order to investigate problems that emerge in digital control
software designed for UAV attitude systems (i.e., software errors caused by fi-
nite word-length effects). Similar work also focuses on low-level implementation
aspects, where Sirigineedi et al. [26] applied a formal modeling language called
SMV to multiple-UAV missions by means of Kripke structures and formal veri-
fication of some of the mission properties typically expressed in Computational
Tree Logic. In this particular study, a deadlock has been found and the trace
generated by SMV has been successfully simulated. However, note that these
prior studies concentrate mainly on the low-level implementation aspects of how
UAVs execute pilot commands. By contrast, here we focus our approach on
the high-level application of UAVs software, which is typically hosted by the
firmware embedded in UAVs.
Despite the previously discussed limitations, BMC techniques have been suc-
cessfully used to verify the correctness of digital circuits, security, and communi-
cation protocols [26]. However, given the current knowledge in ensuring security
of UAVs, the combination of fuzzing and BMC techniques have not been used
before for detecting security vulnerabilities in UAV software. UAV software is
used for mapping, aerial analysis and to get optimized images. In this study, we
propose to use both techniques to detect security vulnerabilities in real-world
UAV software.
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3 Finding Software Vulnerabilities in UAVs Using
Software Verification
3.1 Software In-The-Loop
UAV software has a crucial role to operate, manage and provide a programmatic
access to the connected UAV system. In particular, before a given UAV starts its
mission, the missioned computer, as illustrated in Fig. 2, exports data required
for this mission from a computer running the flight planning software. Then,
the flight planning software allows the operator to set the required flight zone
(way-point mission engine), where the UAV will follow this route throughout its
mission instead of using a traditional remote controller directly [9].
Dronekit6 is an open-source software project, which allows one to command a
UAV using Python script. In addition, it enables the pilot to manage and direct
control over the UAV movement and operation, as illustrated in Fig. 3, where
one can connect to the UAV via a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) endpoint with
the goal of gaining control of the UAV by means of the “vehicle” object. This
control process relies on the planning software inside the UAVs system, which in
some cases the embedded software might be permanently connected to the pilot
controlling system (e.g., Remote Controller or Ground Control Station) due to
live feedback or for real-time streaming.
1 from dronek i t import connect
2 # Connect to UDP endpoint .
3 v eh i c l e = connect ( ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 1 4 5 50 ’ , wa i t ready=True )
4 # Use returned Vehic le ob j e c t to query device s t a t e :
5 print ( ”Mode : %s ” % veh i c l e .mode . name)
Fig. 3. Python script to connect to a vehicle (real or simulated).
Our main goal is to investigate in depth open-source UAVs code (e.g., DJI
Tello7 and Parrot Bebop8) for any potential security vulnerabilities. For example,
Fig. 4 depicts a simple Python code to read and view various data status of Tello
UAV. In particular, this Python code imports and defines the required libraries
and then connects GCS to the UAV, by using the predefined port and IP address
in lines 19 and 20. As we can see in line 22, the UAV will acknowledge the pilot
commands and print the Tello current status. If an attacker is able to scan and
locate the IP address that this particular UAV has used, then he/she would be
able to easily intercept the data transmitted, inject a malicious code or take the
drone out of service using a denial of service attack. In order to detect potential
security vulnerabilities in UAV software, we provide here an initial insight of how
to combine BMC and fuzzing techniques with the goal of exploring the system
state-space to ensure safe and secure operation of UAVs.
6 https://github.com/dronekit/dronekit-python
7 https://github.com/dji-sdk/Tello-Python
8 https://github.com/amymcgovern/pyparrot
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1 import socket
2 from time import s l e ep
3 import cu r s e s
4 INTERVAL = 0.2
5 def r epor t ( str ) :
6 s t d s c r . addstr (0 , 0 , str )
7 s t d s c r . r e f r e s h ( )
8 i f name == ” main ” :
9 s t d s c r = cur s e s . i n i t s c r ( )
10 cu r s e s . noecho ( )
11 cu r s e s . cbreak ( )
12
13 l o c a l i p = ’ ’
14 l o c a l p o r t = 8890
15 socket=socket . socket ( socket .AF INET , socket .SOCKDGRAM)
16 # socket for sending cmd
17 socket . bind ( ( l o c a l i p , l o c a l p o r t ) )
18
19 t e l l o i p = ’ 192 . 1 68 . 1 0 . 1 ’
20 t e l l o p o r t = 8889
21 t e l l o a d d e r s s = ( t e l l o i p , t e l l o p o r t )
22
23 socket . sendto ( ’command ’ . encode ( ’ utf−8 ’ ) , t e l l o a d d e r s s )
24 try :
25 index = 0
26 while True :
27 index += 1
28 response , ip = socket . recvfrom (1024)
29 i f re sponse == ’ ok ’ :
30 continue
31 out = response . r ep l a c e ( ’ ; ’ , ’ ;\n ’ )
32 out = ’ Te l l o State :\n ’ + out
33 r epor t ( out )
34 s l e ep (INTERVAL)
35 except KeyboardInterrupt :
36 cu r s e s . echo ( )
37 cu r s e s . nocbreak ( )
38 cu r s e s . endwin ( )
Fig. 4. Simple code to read and view the various data status of Tello UAV.
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3.2 Illustrative Example – UAV swarm
Throughout this paper, we use an illustrative example from UAV swarm. In
particular, we participated in a competitive-exercise9, organized in early 2019
and with participants from across five different UK universities. The main goal
of this event was teams from across the UK to compete against each other in a
game of offense and defense using swarms of UAVs, as illustrated in Fig. 5. As a
result, this competition allowed us to highlight aspects of how to protect urban
spaces from UAV swarms, which is a serious concern of our modern society.
This competition was sponsored by the British multinational defense, security,
and aerospace company (BAE). Solutions developed by industry, such as the
“jamming guns” and single “UAV catchers”, fall short of what would be required
to defend against a large automated UAV swarm attack.
Fig. 5. UAV Swarm Competition.
For this particular illustrative example, using software verification and the
UAV connection weakness, we were able to perform a successful cyber-attack
against UAV models by scanning the radio frequencies and targeting the un-
wanted UAVs with just a raspberry-pi, a Linux OS installed on and 2.4 GHz
antennas, as reported in our experimental evaluation.
3.3 Insights about the combination of Fuzzing and BMC
Approaches to UAV software
We describe our initial insight about a novel approach called “UAV Fuzzer” to
investigate security vulnerabilities in UAVs (e.g., no buffer overflow, no derefer-
encing of null pointers, and no pointers pointing to unallocated memory regions).
In particular, in order to detect security vulnerabilities in UAV software, we first
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyyaY1VXqL4
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run a fuzzer engine using pre-collected test cases10, with the goal of initially ex-
ploring the state-space of the UAV software operation. Here we keep track of the
execution paths, which have been initially explored by our fuzzer; in particular,
when the fuzzer engine gets stuck (e.g., the mutations generated were not suited
enough to the new state transitions), our BMC tool runs against the target soft-
ware to symbolically explore its uncovered state-space with the goal of checking
the unexplored execution paths of the UAV software.
Our initial evaluation of the BMC approach relies on DepthK [25], which is
k -induction verifier based on invariant inference for C programs. In particular,
DepthK uses BMC techniques and invariant generators such as PIPS [23] and
PAGAI [15], in order to both falsify and verify C programs. PIPS is an inter-
procedural source-to-source compiler framework for C and Fortran programs.
PAGAI is a tool for automatic static analysis, which is able to automatically
produce inductive invariants; both invariant generators rely on a polyhedral
abstraction of program behavior for inferring invariants.
As a result, our UAV fuzzer is used to find any potential security vulnera-
bilities (e.g., buffer and integer overflow) and to address the issues BMC and
fuzzing techniques still face when dealing with real-world UAV software, such as
complex checks guarded by the execution paths of the program as well as de-
ployment challenges. In addition, our UAV fuzzer is used to investigate whether
it is possible to hijack the UAV through its embedded software. Successfully
exploiting such security vulnerabilities will have a wider impact, because of the
sensitivity of the UAV and the role embedded software plays on the UAV system.
The main steps for our proposed verification algorithm are as below:
Algorithm 1 UAV Fuzzer
1: Define pre-collected test cases to be employed by the fuzzing engine.
2: Fuzzer engine begins to explore the first execution path in our UAV software and
produce malformed inputs to test for potential security vulnerabilities.
3: Repeat step 2 until the fuzzer engine reaches a crashing point or it cannot explore
the next compartment (due to complex guard checks).
4: DepthK runs the two invariant generators to produce inductive invariants with the
goal of feeding them into a k -induction-based verification algorithm.
5: Guide DepthK to verify execution paths that have not been previously explored
by our fuzzer engine in steps 2 and 3.
6: Repeat steps 4 and 5 until DepthK falsifies or verifies safety/security properties in
UAVs.
7: Once the DepthK completely verifies the UAV code in step 6, it returns “false” if a
property violation is found, “true” if it is able to prove correctness, or “unknown”.
10 Note that a test case should be similar to a real valid data, but it must contain a
problem on it, or also called “anomalies”. For example, to fuzz Microsoft office, a test
case should be a word document or excel sheet, so the mutated version generated of
such a similar package is called a test case.
10 O. Alhawi et al.
3.4 UAV Communication Channel
An UAV has a radio to enable and facilitate remote communication between the
ground control station and the UAV. In addition, it consists of different electronic
components, which interact autonomously with a goldmine of data transmitted
over the air during its flight’s missions. This makes the communication channel
in UAVs an ideal target for a remote cyber-threat. Therefore, ensuring secure
(bug-free) software, together with a secure communication channel, emerge as a
priority in successful deployment of any UAV system.
A successful false-data injection attack, which had devastating effects on the
UAV system was demonstrated by Strohmeier et al. [27], where the authors were
able to successfully inject valid-looking messages, which are well-formed with
reasonable data into the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B) protocol. Note that this protocol is currently the only means of air traffic
surveillance today, where Europe and US must comply with the mandatory use
of this insecure protocol by the end of 2020.
In order to investigate this layer further, we used Software-Defined Radio
(SDR) system to receive, transmit, and analyze the UAV operational connection
system (e.g., Ku-Band and WiFi). We have also investigated the information
exchanged between UAV sensors and the surrounding environment for any po-
tential security vulnerabilities (e.g., GPS Spoofing), as illustrated in Fig. 6. The
signal that comes from the satellite is weak. Hence, if an attacker uses a local
transmitter under the same frequency, this signal would be stronger than the
original satellite signal. As a result, the spoofed GPS-signal will override current
satellite-signal, thereby leading to spoof a fake position for the UAV targeted. In
this particular case, the UAV would then be hijacked and put in hold, waiting
for the attacker’s next command. Therefore, verifying the UAV software to build
practical software systems with strong safety and security guarantees is highly
needed in practice.
4 Preliminary Experimental Evaluation
We have performed a preliminary evaluation of our proposed verification ap-
proach to detect security vulnerabilities in UAVs. In particular, we have evalu-
ated the DepthK tool over a set of standard C benchmarks, which share common
features of UAV code (e.g., concurrency and arithmetic operations). We have also
evaluated our fuzzer engine to test a PDF software with the goal of checking its
efficiency and efficacy to identify bugs. Lastly, we present our results in the
swarm competition promoted by BAE systems.
4.1 Description of Benchmarks
The International Software Verification Competition (SV-COMP) [28], where
DepthK participated, was run on a Linux Ubuntu 18.04 OS, 15 GB of RAM
memory, a run-time limit of 15 minutes for each verification task and eight
processing units of i7 − 4790 CPU. The SV-COMP’s benchmarks used in this
experimental evaluation include:
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Fig. 6. Spoofing : GPS-satellite-signal is overlaid by a spoofed GPS-signal.
– ReachSafety : which contains benchmarks for checking reachability of an error
location;
– MemSafety : which presents benchmarks for checking memory safety;
– ConcurrencySafety : which provides benchmarks for checking concurrency
problems;
– Overflows: which is composed of benchmarks for checking whether variables
of signed-integers type overflow;
– Termination: which contains benchmarks for which termination should be
decided;
– SoftwareSystems: which provides benchmarks from real software systems.
Our fuzzing experiments were ran on MacBook Pro laptop with 2.9 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of memory. We ran our fuzzing engine for at
most of 12 hours for each single binary file. We analyzed and replayed the testing
result after a crash was reported or after the fuzzer hit the time limit. In order to
analyze the radio frequencies and get in-depth sight of it, we configured/compiled
the required software for this purpose (e.g. bladerf, GQRX, OsmoSDR, and GNU
Radio tool) using bladerf x40 device, ALFA high gain USB Wireless adapter and
2.4 GHz antennas. Additionally, we used the open-source UAVs code DJI Tello
and Parrot Bebop.
12 O. Alhawi et al.
4.2 Objectives
The impact of our study is a novel insight on the UAV security potential risks. In
summary, our evaluation has the following two experimental questions to answer:
EQ1 (Localization) Can DepthK help us understand the security vulnerabilities
that have been detected?
EQ2 (Detection) Can generational or mutational fuzzers be further developed
to detect vulnerabilities in real-world software?
EQ3 (Cyber-attacks) Are we able to perform successful cyber-attacks in com-
mercial UAVs?
4.3 Results
Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the verification process of some
of the vulnerabilities that are difficult to detect. Our experiments also show signs
of the fragility of a commercial UAV system as described below.
SV-COMP. From a different angle, concurrency bugs in UAVs are one of
the most difficult vulnerabilities to verify [26]. Our software verifier DepthK [25]
has been used to verify and falsify safety properties in C programs, using BMC
and k -induction proof rule techniques.
In late 2018, we participated with the DepthK tool in SV-COMP 201911
against other software verifiers. Our verifier showed promising results over thou-
sands of verification tasks, which are of particular interest to UAVs security (e.g.
ConcurrencySafety and Overflows categories), which answers EQ1. DepthK was
able to compete against many other verifiers during SV-COMP 2019. Concurren-
cySafety category, which consists of 1082 benchmarks of concurrency problems, is
one of the many categories verifiers run over; DepthK was able to accurately de-
tect 966 problems from this category. For the Overflows category, which consists
of 359 benchmarks for different signed-integers overflow bugs, DepthK was able
to detect 167 problems. These results are summarized in Table 1. A task counts
as correct true if it does not contain any reachable error location or assertion
violation, and the tool reports “safe”; however, if the tool reports “unsafe”, it
counts as incorrect true. Similarly, a task counts as correct false if it does contain
a reachable violation, and the tool reports “unsafe”, together with a confirmed
witness (path to failure); otherwise, it counts as incorrect false accordingly. In
addition, Fig. 7 and 8, extracted from SV-COMP 2019, show DepthK’s results
when compared with other verifiers.
Fuzzing Approach. According to a prior study [1], the generalizing fuzzing
approach leads to a better result in discovering and recording software vulner-
abilities compared with the mutational fuzzing approach if the test cases used
in the fuzzing experiment are taken into account, which answers EQ2. Our ex-
perimental results applied to a PDF software called Sumatra PDF12, which was
chosen for evaluation purposes, are shown in Table 2. Here, the generational
fuzzer was able to detect 70 faults in 45 hours in the Sumatra PDF, while the
mutational fuzzer was able to detect 23 in 15 hours.
11 https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2019/
12 https://www.sumatrapdfreader.org/free-pdf-reader.html
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Table 1. DepthK Results in SV-COMP 2019.
Category list Correct True Correct False Incorrect
Results
Unknown
Concurrency
Safety
194 772 20 96
Overflows 17 150 0 192
Fig. 7. Concurrency Safety category among other verifier tools [28].
Fig. 8. Overflow category among other verifier tools [28].
Table 2. Fuzzing Approaches Comparison.
Fuzzing
Approaches
Target Time Faults
Generational Fuzzer Sumatra PDF 45 hours 70
Mutational Fuzzer Sumatra PDF 15 hours 23
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UAV Swarm Competition. As part of our participation at the UAV swarm
competition sponsored by (BAE)13, penetration testing was performed against
the UAV both connection and software system, in which we were able to per-
form successful cyber-attacks, which answers EQ3. These attacks resulted in
managing to deliberately to crash UAVs or to take the control of different UAV
systems (e.g., Tello and Parrot Bebop 2). This was achieved by sending connec-
tion requests to shut down a UAV CPU, thereby sending packets of data that
exceed the capacity allocated by the buffer of the UAV’s flight application and
by sending a fake information packet to the device’s controller. These results are
summarized in Table 3, where we describe the employed UAV models and tools
and whether we were able to obtain full control or crash.
Table 3. Results of the UAV Swarm Competition.
Vulnerability
type
UAV Model Tool Result
Spoofing DJI Tello Wi-Fi transmitter Full Control
Denial of service Full Control
Spoofing Parrot bebop 2 Wi-Fi transmitter Full Control
Denial of service Crash
4.4 Threats to Validity
Benchmark selection: We report the evaluation of our approach over a set of
real-world benchmarks, where the UAVs share the same component structure.
Nevertheless, this set is limited within our research scope and the experiment
results may not generalize to other models because other UAV models have
a proprietary source-code. Additionally, we have not evaluated our verification
approach using real UAV code written in Python, which is our main goal for
future research.
Radio Spectrum: The frequencies we report on our evaluation were between
2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz, as the two most common ranges for civilian UAVs; how-
ever, the radio regulations in the UK are complicated (e.g., we are required to
be either licensed or exempted from licensing for any transmission over the air).
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Our ultimate goal is to develop a UAV fuzzer to be introduced as mainstream
into the current UAV programming system, in order to build practical software
systems robust to cyber-attacks. We have reported here an initial insight of
our verification approach and some preliminary results using similar software
typically used by UAVs. In order to achieve our ultimate goal, we have various
tasks planned as follows:
13 https://www.cranfield.ac.uk/press/news-2019/bae-competition-
challenges-students-to-counter-threat--from-uavs
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– Vulnerability Assessment: Identify and implement simple cyber-attacks
from a single point of attack against different UAV models. We will continue
investigating Python vulnerabilities at the high-level system (e.g., UAV ap-
plications) and whether UAVs software is exploitable to those security vul-
nerabilities.
– Python Fuzzer: We will develop an automated python fuzzer by analyzing
how to convert the UAV command packets into a fuzzing ones, in order to
produce test cases, which are amenable to our proposed fuzzer.
– GPS Analysis: We identified based on numerical analysis on GPS, the
cyber-attack UAVs might be vulnerable from. This investigation will con-
tinue to develop and simulate a GPS attack applied to a real UAV system.
– Implementation: Apply our proposed verification approach to test real-
world software vulnerabilities, which can be implemented during the software
development life-cycle to design a cyber-secure architecture.
– Evaluation and Application: Evaluate our proposed approach using real-
world UAV implementation software. We will also compare our approach in
different stages to check its effectiveness and efficiency.
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